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Consider the problem of implementing a social choice function (SCF) in an
environment with incomplete information among the agents. Since the so-
cially desirable outcome depends on agents’ private information, it is possible
that agents do not have the incentive to correctly reveal their private informa-
tion. Bayesian incentive compatibility of an SCF is simply the requirement
that each agent has the incentive to truthfully reveal her information when
all other agents report their information truthfully. More precisely, an SCF
is said to be incentive compatible if truth-telling is a Bayesian Nash equi-
librium of the direct revelation game (in which agents report their private
information and the outcome is the social choice corresponding to these re-
ports). By the revelation principle (see Myerson (1989) and the references
therein), incentive compatibility of an SCF is necessary for it to be imple-
mented through a Bayesian Nash equilibrium of any mechanism. In general,
however, a mechanism applied to an incentive compatible SCF may possess
other equilibria (which do not correspond to the socially desired outcome).
Full implementation refers to the design of a mechanism that resolves this
multiplicity problem by ensuring that all equilibria correspond to the socially
desired outcome in each information state, and requires some condition in
addition to incentive compatibility.
Postlewaite and Schmeidler (1986) showed that a necessary condition (in
addition to incentive compatibility) for a social choice set to be Bayesian im-
plementable is Bayesian monotonicity. As the term Bayesian monotonicity
suggests, this condition can be seen as an analog of Maskin monotonicity
(Maskin (1977)) in the presence of incomplete information.1 Palfrey and Sri-
vastava (1989a) found a weakening of incentive compatibility and a variant
of Bayesian monotonicity that turned out to be suﬃcient for implementation
in exchange economies. Within economic environments, the gap after Pal-
frey and Srivastava’s work between necessary and suﬃcient conditions was
closed by Jackson (1991) with a strengthening of Bayesian monotonicity.2
1Recall that Maskin monotonicity is a necessary condition for Nash implementation.
It also turns out to be suﬃcient in environments where there is a private good and at
least three agents. This condition is satisﬁed by many correspondences of interest in
exchange economies (such as the Pareto, core and constrained Walrasian correspondences).
However, it may be quite restrictive in other domains (see, for example, Mueller and
Satterthwaite (1977) and Saijo (1987)).
2Jackson (1991) also provides suﬃcient conditions that guarantee implementation out-
1Unfortunately, Bayesian monotonicity is not satisﬁed by many well-known
social choice functions (SCFs) for exchange economies with incomplete infor-
mation; see Palfrey and Srivastava (1987), Chakravorti (1992) and Serrano
and Vohra (2001). In this sense, Bayesian monotonicity is a demanding con-
dition. In light of Jackson’s characterization result this means that (full)
Bayesian implementation is a demanding requirement.
There is another sense in which the complete information environment
seems to yield more permissive implementation results. Remarkably, the
Maskin monotonicity condition can be entirely dispensed with by slightly
weakening the notion of implementation. This is the main insight of Abreu
and Sen (1991) and Matsushima (1988), who show that under very mild
conditions, any social choice correspondence can be virtually Nash imple-
mented in the sense that, making use of lotteries over social alternatives,
it is possible to exactly implement an SCF that is arbitrarily close to the
given correspondence.3 Moreover, Abreu and Matsushima (1992a) provide
a signiﬁcant improvement of these results by showing that under very weak
conditions any SCF can be virtually implemented in the more attractive no-
tion of iteratively undominated strategies, and that this is possible without
the use of mechanisms involving integer games.
Given the power of the virtual approach in the complete information case,
and given that Bayesian monotonicity is often a very strong condition, it is
natural to ask if one can ﬁnd simpler and/or weaker conditions for virtual im-
plementation in the presence of incomplete information. That some condition
(in addition to incentive compatibility) is needed even for virtual Bayesian
implementation is clear from Example 1 in Serrano and Vohra (2001): there
are environments with incomplete information in which only constant SCFs
can be virtually implemented. Thus, in contrast to the complete information
results, even virtual implementation requires non-trivial restrictions either
on the environment or the SCF.
Our aim here is to settle two open issues in this literature:
• Characterize the SCFs that are virtually Bayesian implementable;
• Provide a simple, weak and readily interpretable condition that is suf-
ﬁcient for virtual Bayesian implementation of an incentive compatible
side of economic environments. He identiﬁes a condition that he terms “monotonicity no
veto” that serves this purpose.
3This can be explained, in part, by the fact that Maskin monotonicity deﬁned over
lotteries is a very weak condition.
2SCF.
It should be emphasized that we are concerned with implementation in pure
Bayesian Nash equilibrium. In this sense our characterization of virtual
Bayesian implementation is comparable to Jackson (1991)’s characterization
of Bayesian implementation.
Two suﬃcient conditions for virtual Bayesian implementation (in addi-
tion to incentive compatibility) are available in the existing literature. Abreu
and Matsushima (1992b) dispense with Bayesian monotonicity and intro-
duce a new condition termed measurability (henceforth A-M measurability)
which, under other weak assumptions, along with incentive compatibility, is
shown to be necessary and suﬃcient for virtual implementation in iteratively
undominated strategies. Their suﬃciency result applies, a fortiori, to the no-
tion of virtual implementation in mixed Bayesian Nash equilibrium. Duggan
(1997) suggests the condition of incentive consistency and presents a suﬃ-
ciency result for environments with “best-element private values.”4 Serrano
and Vohra (2001) criticize A-M measurability and incentive consistency, by
showing them to be sometimes even stronger than Bayesian monotonicity.
Indeed, there are environments where every SCF is virtually Bayesian im-
plementable, but only constant SCFs satisfy A-M measurability or incentive
consistency. Thus, A-M measurability or incentive consistency are far from
necessary for virtual Bayesian implementation. For a more detailed compar-
ison of these results with ours, see section 1.1 below.
Our main result shows that in environments satisfying no-total-indiﬀerence
(NTI), an incentive compatible SCF is virtually implementable if and only if
it satisﬁes a condition we term virtual monotonicity. This result includes two-
agent and ‘non-economic’ environments. Virtual monotonicity is inspired by
the Bayesian monotonicity condition stated in Jackson (1991), and by the
arguments used by Matsushima (1988) and Abreu and Sen (1991) for vir-
tual Nash implementation. Like Maskin monotonicity (Maskin (1977)) and
the conditions and insights used by those authors, virtual monotonicity is a
condition on lower contour sets of preferences. Those papers and our char-
acterization result provide a uniﬁed theory of implementation using pure
Nash equilibrium as a solution concept. Our new monotonicity condition
requires, for each deception that undermines the given SCF, the existence
4In the same endeavor of attempting to dispense with Bayesian monotonicity, Mat-
sushima (1993) shows that this can be done if side payments are allowed. In contrast, our
results do not rely on transfers.
3of a certain preference reversal for at least one type of one agent. Such a
preference reversal is not required to hold for the given SCF but for some in-
centive compatible SCF, thereby making it a weaker condition than Bayesian
monotonicity. In section 5, we shall consider an important example, due to
Palfrey and Srivastava (1989b), of a common-values environment. In this
example, the majoritarian SCF does not satisfy Bayesian monotonicity (or
indeed, any of the other available suﬃcient conditions for implementation
in other solution concepts). Nor does it satisfy AM-measurability or incen-
tive consistency. But it does satisfy virtual monotonicity, and is therefore
virtually Bayesian implementable. In fact, in this example, all SCFs satisfy
virtual monotonicity.
Our characterization result demonstrates that virtual Bayesian imple-
mentation is far more permissive than Bayesian implementation. The argu-
ment goes beyond the fact that virtual monotonicity is weaker than Bayesian
monotonicity. As we will show, there is a related condition on environments,
which we term type diversity, such that any incentive compatible SCF is vir-
tually implementable in such environments. This condition is stronger than
the necessary condition (it implies that every SCF satisﬁes virtual monotonic-
ity), but it is much easier to state and interpret. It requires that the interim
(cardinal) preferences over pure alternatives of diﬀerent types of an agent
be diﬀerent.5 It is considerably easier to verify than the other conditions
mentioned above. More importantly, type diversity turns out to be generic
in the set of all environments with at least three alternatives. This implies
that in most environments, since every SCF satisﬁes virtual monotonicity,
every SCF is virtually implementable in Bayesian equilibrium provided it is
incentive compatible. In other words, the problem of multiplicity of equilib-
rium in mechanism design under incomplete information can be completely
solved if one takes two degrees of approximation: (a) in the solution concept,
by requiring virtual instead of exact implementation, and (b) in the environ-
ments, by perturbing them if necessary to ensure type diversity. In doing so,
Bayesian incentive compatibility remains the only important restriction on
an SCF for full implementation.
5This condition appears in Abreu and Matsushima (1992b) as a simple way of ensuring
A-M measurability. In environments satisfying type diversity, every SCF also satisﬁes
incentive consistency. In a private values model, it reduces to the condition of value-
distinguished types introduced in Palfrey and Srivastava (1989b).
41.1 A Comparison with the Related Literature
As indicated above, our characterization of virtual Bayesian implementation
in pure strategies is most related to Jackson’s (1991) Theorem 1 - both are
concerned with implementation in pure strategies. The diﬀerence is that we
also include non-economic environments and the case of two agents; and in
weakening the implementation requirement from exact to virtual Bayesian
implementation we can weaken his Bayesian monotonicity condition to vir-
tual monotonicity.
Abreu and Matsushima (1992b) show that if mixed strategies are in-
cluded and mechanisms are restricted to be regular, then virtual Bayesian
Nash implementation is characterized by incentive compatibility and AM
measurability. A characterization for the case in which mixed strategies are
included, but mechanisms are not required to be regular, remains open.
Duggan (1997) covers mixed equilibria in his suﬃciency result. He also
uses general type spaces, whereas we assume a ﬁnite set of types. His main
result assumes an “ex post no-total-indiﬀerence” condition, instead of our
somewhat stronger NTI. However, he also assumes “best element private
values”, which in conjunction with his version of NTI implies our NTI con-
dition. An important issue for future work is a characterization that allows
mixed strategies and general type spaces.
2 The Model and Deﬁnitions
We shall consider implementation in the context of a general environment
with asymmetric information. Let N = {1,...,n} be a ﬁnite set of agents.
Let Ti denote the (ﬁnite) set of agent i’s types. The interpretation is that
ti ∈ Ti describes the private information possessed by agent i. We refer to
a proﬁle of types t =( t1,...,t n) as a state. Let T =
Q
i∈N Ti be the set of
states. We will use the notation t−i to denote (tj)j6=i. Similarly T−i =
Q
j6=i Tj.
Each agent has a prior probability distribution qi deﬁned on T.W e
assume that for every i ∈ N and ti ∈ Ti, there exists t−i ∈ T−i such that
qi(t) > 0. For each i ∈ N and ¯ ti ∈ Ti, the conditional probability of t−i ∈ T−i,
given ¯ ti is denoted qi(t−i | ¯ ti). Let T ∗ ⊆ T be the set of states with positive
probability. We assume that agents agree on the states in T ∗, i.e., for all
i ∈ N, qi(t) = 0 if and only if t/ ∈ T ∗.
Let A denote the set of social alternatives, which are assumed to be
5independent of the information state. Let A be a σ-algebra on A and 4
denote the set of probability measures on (A,A). We shall assume that A
contains all singleton sets.
We can now deﬁne an environment as E = {(A,A),(ui,T i,q i)i∈N}.
A social choice function (SCF) is a function f : T 7→ 4. Two SCFs, f and
h are equivalent (f ≈ h)i ff(t)=h(t) for every t ∈ T ∗ (see Jackson (1991) for
a discussion on equivalent SCFs). We shall concentrate on SCFs rather than
social choice sets because our main interest lies in virtual implementation
making use of lotteries over A; a social choice set can be understood as a
random function that puts positive measure only on the functions that it
includes.
The Bernoulli utility of agent i for alternative a in state t is ui(a,t).
Abusing notation slightly, given an SCF f, ui(f,t) will refer to agent i’s ex-
pected utility evaluation of lottery f(t) in state t. The (interim/conditional)











We shall make the (weak) regularity assumption that there is no-total-
indiﬀerence. This assumption will be in force throughout the paper.
An environment E satisﬁes no-total-indiﬀerence (NTI) if for every j ∈ N,
and T 0
−j ⊆ T−j such that {tj}×T 0










Since N and T are ﬁnite, it follows that there is a ﬁnite set ¯ A ⊆ A such that
a and a0 in the above condition belong to ¯ A.
This assumption amounts to the statement that there is no total-indiﬀerence
for each agent of each type whatever the updated beliefs about the other
agents’ types, provided that the updating is consistent with Bayes’ rule.
Hence, NTI includes the assumption of no-total-indiﬀerence ex-post (made in
Duggan (1997)) as well as interim (Abreu and Matsushima (1992b)). While
our assumption is stronger than the corresponding assumption in Duggan
(1997), he also makes another assumption, best element private values, and
it can be shown that the conjunction of that and his ex-post NTI condition
is stronger than our version of NTI.
6A mechanism G =( ( Mi)i∈N,g) describes a message space Mi for agent i
and an outcome function g :
Q
i∈N Mi 7→ 4.
A (pure strategy) Bayesian equilibrium of G is a proﬁle of strategies,





i : Ti 7→ Mi.
Denote by B(G) the set of Bayesian equilibria of the mechanism G. Let
g(B(G)) be the corresponding set of equilibrium outcomes.
An SCF f is exactly Bayesian implementable if there exists a mechanism
G such that every h ∈ g(B(G)) is equivalent to f.6
A direct mechanism is one with Mi = Ti for all i ∈ N.
Consider the following metric on SCFs:
d(f,h) = sup{|f(S | t) − h(S | t)||t ∈ T
∗,S∈A } .
An SCF f is virtually Bayesian implementable if ∀￿>0 there exists an
SCF f￿ such that d(f,f￿) <￿and f￿ is exactly Bayesian implementable.
A deception is a proﬁle of functions, α =( αi)i∈N, where αi : Ti 7→ Ti,
αi(ti) 6= ti for some ti ∈ Ti for some i ∈ N. (Note that the identity function
on T is not a deception.) For an SCF f and a deception α, f ◦ α denotes
the SCF such that for each t ∈ T,[ f ◦ α](t)=f(α(t)). For an SCF f,a
deception α and a type ti ∈ Ti, let fαi(ti)(t0)=f(t0
−i,α i(ti)) for all t0 ∈ T.
The next condition is necessary for exact Bayesian implementation (see
Jackson (1991)).7
An SCF f satisﬁes Bayesian monotonicity if for any deception α, when-
ever f ◦ α 6≈ f, there exist i ∈ N, ti ∈ Ti and an SCF y such that
Ui(y ◦ α | ti) >U i(f ◦ α | ti) while Ui(f | t
0





6Exact implementation in environments with incomplete information has also been de-
ﬁned with respect to solution concepts other than Bayesian equilibrium, such as undomi-
nated Bayesian equilibrium (Palfrey and Srivastava (1989b)), perfect Bayesian equilibrium
(Brusco (1995)), sequential equilibrium (Baliga (1999), Bergin and Sen (1998)). In each
case, the deﬁnition of exact implementation requires the set of outcomes selected by the
chosen solution concept in the mechanism to coincide with the social choice set.
7There is an extra condition termed closure, that requires the social choice set to be
closed under concatenation of common knowledge events, but this is not too demanding.
In any case, this condition will not be relevant in what follows since it is trivially satisﬁed
for SCFs.
7An SCF f satisﬁes incentive compatibility if for all i ∈ N, ti ∈ Ti and all
deceptions α,
Ui(f | ti) ≥ Ui(fαi(ti) | ti).
Jackson (1991) provides a characterization result for economic environ-
ments with at least three agents: a social choice function is Bayesian im-
plementable if and only if it satisﬁes incentive compatibility and Bayesian
monotonicity.8 This result can be readily compared to our characterization
theorem for virtual Bayesian implementation, found in the next section.
3 A Characterization Result
In this section we show that a substantial weakening of Bayesian monotonic-
ity yields a necessary and suﬃcient condition, together with incentive com-
patibility, for virtual Bayesian implementation.
An SCF f satisﬁes virtual monotonicity if for every deception α, whenever
f 6≈ f ◦α, there exists i ∈ N, ti ∈ Ti, an incentive compatible SCF x and an
SCF y such that
Ui(y ◦ α | ti) >U i(x ◦ α | ti) while Ui(x | t
0




i ∈ Ti. (∗)
The diﬀerence with Bayesian monotonicity is that the preference reversal
in the new condition does not necessarily involve the SCF f. For each decep-
tion α such that f ◦ α 6≈ f, we have an agent for whom some of their types
exhibit a preference reversal between two SCFs as speciﬁed in (*). Clearly,
virtual monotonicity is weaker than Bayesian monotonicity. A more detailed
comparison of the two is provided in section 3.1, where we show that the nec-
essary preference reversal can be shown to hold for SCFs that are arbitrarily
close to f. This is our rationale for the term “virtual monotonicity”. We
postpone to section 4 a discussion of how weak virtual monotonicity really
is, and how it follows from a much simpler condition that does not involve
any reference to deceptions.
Our main result is the following characterization theorem.
Theorem 1 Suppose an environment E satisﬁes NTI. Then, a social choice
function f is virtually Bayesian implementable if and only if it satisﬁes in-
centive compatibility and virtual monotonicity.
8In the more general case of a social choice set, an added condition, closure, is also
needed.
8In comparing this result to Jackson’s (1991) Theorem 1, note that our
characterization of virtual Bayesian implementation does not assume the
environment to be economic, nor does it require the number of agents to
be at least three. In terms of the conditions on the SCF, closure being a
trivial requirement then, the only diﬀerence reduces to requiring Bayesian
monotonicity instead of its virtual counterpart.
Proof of Theorem 1.
Necessity. Since the necessity of incentive compatibility is well known, we
shall show that virtual monotonicity is necessary for virtually implementing
an incentive compatible SCF.9
Consider a deception α such that f ◦ α 6≈ f, and suppose f is virtually
implementable, i.e., for every ￿>0 there exists and SCF f￿ which is imple-
mentable and is ￿-close to f. Thus f￿ satisﬁes incentive compatibility and
Bayesian monotonicity. Choosing ￿ small enough, it follows that for the given
deception α, f￿ ◦ α 6≈ f￿, and by Bayesian monotonicity of f￿, there exists
i ∈ N, ti ∈ Ti and an SCF y such that
Ui(y ◦ α | ti) >U i(f
￿ ◦ α | ti) while Ui(f
￿ | t
0




i ∈ Ti. (1)
But this means that whenever f ◦ α 6≈ f, there exist i ∈ N, ti ∈ Ti and a
pair of SCFs, x (incentive compatible) and y satisfying (*); simply choose
x = f￿. Thus f satisﬁes virtual monotonicity.
Sufficiency. Suppose f satisﬁes incentive compatibility and virtual monotonic-
ity. We shall construct a canonical mechanism, G =( ( Mi)i∈N,g) to virtually
implement f in Bayesian equilibrium. Before we describe the strategy sets
and the outcome function, we introduce some additional notation.
For a deception α such that f ◦ α 6≈ f, a test-agent is any i ∈ N for
whom condition (*) holds. Denote by Di the set of deceptions for which i is
a test-agent. For each test-agent i and each deception α ∈ Di, ﬁx two SCFs
xα
i and yα
i satisfying (*) for i of type ti, where xα
i is incentive compatible.
Notice that condition (*) concerns the SCF y only in those states in which
agent i is of type αi(ti). There is, therefore, no loss of generality in assuming
9See Duggan (1997). Strictly speaking, what is necessary is the existence of an equiv-
alent SCF that is incentive compatible, but given the deﬁnition of implementation, there
is no loss of generality in taking f itself to be incentive compatible. This should also be
understood in the way Theorem 1 is stated.
9that yα







i (t−i,t i) for all t−i ∈ T−i and t0
i ∈ Ti.
Thus yα
i is constant over Ti.10
If agent i is a test agent for some α, let
Ci = {(z
α







Thus, a typical element of the set Ci is a list of |Di| components. Each
component is one of the two SCFs in (*) associated with a deception α for
which agent i is a test-agent. If agent i is not a test-agent for any deception
α, let Di = {¯ α} for some arbitrary deception ¯ α and let Ci = {xi} for some
arbitrary, incentive compatible SCF xi. Let xi ∈ Ci be such that for all
α ∈ Di, zα
i = xα
i .
Denote by ˆ f the constant SCF that prescribes the uniform probability
distribution over ¯ A in each state. For any a ∈ ¯ A and λ ∈ [0,1] deﬁne
a(λ)=λa +( 1− λ) ˆ f.
















We will now prove that f￿ is Bayesian implementable with the following
mechanism:
The message set of agent i is deﬁned as Mi = Ti×Ci× ¯ A×I, where I is the




i) a typical message
sent by agent i, and by m a proﬁle of messages. The outcome function is
deﬁned by the following rules:
(i) If m is such that at least n−1 agents announce m2
i =( zα
i )α∈Di = xi and
m4



















10This observation also applies to the deﬁnition of Bayesian monotonicity.
10(ii) Otherwise, denoting by h the agent with the lowest index among those


























To prove the theorem, we take the following steps:
Step 1: A strategy proﬁle where for each i ∈ N and each ti ∈ Ti, mi(ti)=
(ti,x i,a i,0) is a Bayesian equilibrium of G. To see this, note that this strat-
egy proﬁle corresponds to the outcome of rule (i). Moreover, no unilateral
deviation from it can trigger rule (ii), and therefore m3
i or m4
i have no eﬀect
on the outcome. The only way an agent can change the outcome is by chang-
ing his announcement of m1
i or m2
i. Since f is incentive compatible, and so
is xα
i for all i ∈ N and α ∈ Di, reporting a false type is not a proﬁtable devi-
ation for any agent. By condition (*) it is not proﬁtable to report a change
in m2




i in Ci is constant with respect to i’s type. Thus, as claimed, this proﬁle is
a Bayesian equilibrium of G. Note that as ￿ → 0, the equilibrium outcome
converges to f.
Step 2. There cannot be an equilibrium σ that induces case (ii) in any state
in T ∗. Let T I ⊆ T ∗ be the set of states in T ∗ in which σ induces the integer
game (case (ii)). Let ˆ n be the highest integer announced in any state in T I,
and let h be the lowest indexed agent who announces ˆ n in some state in T I.
Thus there exists a state t ∈ T ∗ in which the integer game is played, and is









By hypothesis, this set is non-empty. By construction, agent h of type th,b y
announcing nh =ˆ n, wins the integer game in all states in {th}×T 0
−h. Since
h is the lowest indexed agent who announces ˆ n in T I, if agent h of type th
changes her announcement of the integer to n0
h > ˆ n, everything else being the
same, she continues to be the winner in precisely the same states as before,
namely {th}×T 0
−h. Let σh(th)=( ˆ th,z h,a h, ˆ n). Consider a strategy σ0
h such
that σ0











































The last inequality is possible because of NTI and the fact that ˆ f assigns



















From (2), (3) and (4), it follows that this expression is positive. But this con-
tradicts the hypothesis that the strategy proﬁle σ is a Bayesian equilibrium.
Step 3: There cannot be an equilibrium σ that, in a state in T ∗, induces rule
(i) of the outcome function g where exactly n−1 agents i announce m2
i = xi
and m4
i = 0, while agent j announces something else. Suppose this happened
under σ in a state t ∈ T ∗. Then, any h 6= j, of type th, can announce n0
h






−h ∈ T−h|∃ one i 6= h with ni > 0o rzi 6= xi}.
These are precisely the states involving th where σ induces a non-unanimous
report within case (i). Let σh(th)=( ˆ th,z h,a h,n h) and consider a strategy
σ0
h(th)=( ˆ th,z h,a 0
h,n 0
h) where n0
h is chosen to ensure that h wins the integer
game in all states in {th}×T 0
−h, and a0
h is chosen to satisfy (4). By changing
σh(th)t oσ0
h(th), agent h of type th can shift some of the probability weight
from ˆ f to a0
h (in states in {th}×T 0
−h) and gain in terms of interim utility.
But this contradicts the hypothesis that σ is a Bayesian equilibrium.
Step 4: Finally, we claim that in any equilibrium of G under rule (i) where
each agent i announces m2
i = xi and m4
i = 0, agents do not use a deception
α where f ◦ α 6≈ f. Suppose not, i.e., there is an equilibrium under rule (i)
in which a deception α is used where f ◦ α 6≈ f. Since f satisﬁes virtual
monotonicity, there exists an agent i and two SCFs xα
i and yα
i satisfying
(*). Therefore, type ti of agent i has an incentive to deviate and change
12the second component of his announcement to (yα
i ,x i(Di \{ α})), which is
a contradiction. Thus, either no deception is used in equilibrium or the
deception being used is such that f ◦ α ≈ f. In either case, therefore,
the equilibrium outcome is f￿. This proves that our mechanism virtually
implements f.
3.1 ￿-Bayesian monotonicity and Virtual Monotonicity
If an SCF f is virtually implementable, then for every ￿>0 there exists an
SCF f￿ such that d(f,f￿) <￿ , and f￿ is Bayesian implementable. Thus, f￿
must satisfy the necessary conditions for Bayesian implementation, namely
incentive compatibility and Bayesian monotonicity. By the same argument
we used in the necessity part of the proof of Theorem 1, this yields the
following necessary condition for virtual Bayesian implementation:
An SCF f satisﬁes ￿- Bayesian monotonicity if for every deception α
satisfying that f 6≈ f ◦ α, and every ￿>0, there exists i ∈ N, ti ∈ Ti,a n
incentive compatible SCF f￿, with d(f,f￿) <￿ , and an SCF y such that
Ui(y ◦ α | ti) >U i(f
￿ ◦ α | ti) while Ui(f
￿ | t
0





Evidently, this condition is stronger than virtual monotonicity, since it
concerns an SCF, f￿, close to f, rather than some arbitrary SCF. However,
the suﬃciency part of theorem 1 implies that in fact the two conditions are
equivalent. A direct proof that (for an incentive compatible SCF) virtual
monotonicity implies ￿-Bayesian monotonicity is as follows.
Suppose f satisﬁes virtual monotonicity and is incentive compatible. Let
α be such that f◦α 6≈ f. Let i, ti, x and y satisfy (*). Deﬁne f￿ =( 1 −￿)f+￿x
and y0 =( 1− ￿)f + ￿y. We claim that f￿ and y0 satisfy the ￿-Bayesian
monotonicity condition for agent i of type ti. Since
Ui(y
0 ◦ α|ti) − Ui(f
￿ ◦ α|ti)=￿[Ui(y ◦ α|ti) − Ui(x ◦ α | ti)],
it follows from (*) that
Ui(y
0 ◦ α|ti) >U i(f
￿ ◦ α|ti) (5)
From (*) we also know that
Ui(x | t
0

















Since, f is incentive compatible,
Ui(f | t
0















i ∈ Ti. (6)
Since f and x are incentive compatible, so is f￿. From (5) and (6) it now
follows that f￿ and y0 satisfy the ￿-Bayesian monotonicity conditions for agent
i of type ti. Thus, virtual monotonicity implies ￿-Bayesian monotonicity.
4 Type Diversity
According to Theorem 1, virtual monotonicity is a necessary condition for
an incentive compatible SCF to be virtually implemented. It is not possi-
ble, therefore, to achieve virtual Bayesian implementation through a weaker
condition. However, this condition, like Bayesian monotonicity, is quite in-
volved, and it is diﬃcult to check whether a given SCF satisﬁes it or not.
Consequently, it is not easy to see (apart from the necessity result) how
weak the condition is. The aim of this section is to identify a simple condi-
tion that is easy to check, readily interpreted, and that implies that every
SCF satisﬁes virtual monotonicity. In addition, we show that this condition
holds generically in environments. In most environments, therefore, virtual
monotonicity is vacuously satisﬁed by any incentive compatible SCF, and
virtual implementation is as permissive as it can possibly be.
We shall ﬁnd it convenient in this Section to assume that the set of
alternatives is ﬁnite; the reader is referred to Section 6 of Abreu and Sen
(1991) for extensions to the case where A is an arbitrary subset of an abstract
separable space.
Let A = {a1,...,a K} be the ﬁnite set of alternatives. Henceforth, we will
ﬁnd it convenient to identify a lottery, x ∈4 , as a point in the unit simplex
in RK, i.e., xk denotes the probability assigned by lottery x to alternative k.
14Deﬁne Uk
i (ti) to be the interim utility of agent i of type ti for the constant









We will show that any incentive compatible SCF is virtually implementable
in Bayesian Nash equilibrium if the environment satisﬁes the following con-
dition:
An environment E satisﬁes type diversity (TD) if there do not exist i ∈ N,
ti,t 0
i ∈ Ti, ti 6= t0




Condition TD has a simple interpretation: it requires that the interim
(cardinal) preferences over pure alternatives of diﬀerent types of an agent
be diﬀerent. Note that this does not require ordinal preferences over pure
alternatives to diﬀer across types unless |A| = 2. Moreover, the condition
only concerns constant SCFs. This condition appears in section 4.2 of Abreu
and Matsushima (1992b) as a simple way of ensuring A-M measurability. In
a private values model, TD reduces to the condition that Palfrey and Sri-
vastava (1989b) call value-distinguished types, but unlike their condition, it
is fully operative regardless of the information structure, including environ-
ments with correlated and common values.11
Type diversity (TD) has the obvious virtue of being simple and easy to
check, especially compared to virtual monotonicity or to other conditions in
the literature, such as Bayesian monotonicity, A-M measurability or incentive
consistency. Importantly, it is easy to see that in the space of preferences
over pure alternatives, TD is satisﬁed generically if |A|≥3. In this sense,
TD is indeed a very weak condition if |A|≥3.12 It is, therefore, remarkable
that TD is suﬃcient for virtual implementation of an incentive compatible
SCF, as will be shown.
11For private values environments, there is a sense in which TD is not a weak condition,
as it implies that each type must diﬀer from the others both in vNM preferences and in
beliefs.
12There is another reason why the weakness of condition TD relies on there being at
least 3 alternatives: if there are only 2 alternatives and an agent has more than 2 types
then this condition cannot hold.
15The following Lemma provides a useful implication of TD from the point
of view of implementation.
Lemma 1 Suppose an environment E satisﬁes TD and NTI. Then there




Ui(li(ti) | ti) >U i(li(t
0
i) | ti).
Proof. Consider the constant SCF ¯ x, which prescribes in each state the
lottery ¯ x, assigning equal probability to each alternative in A, i.e., ¯ x(t)=
(1/K,...,1/K)) for all t ∈ T. We will show that for i ∈ N, ti,t 0
i ∈ Ti, ti 6= t0
i,
there exist constant SCFs x and x0, close to ¯ x, such that
Ui(x | ti) >U i(x
0 | ti) and Ui(x
0 | t
0
i) >U i(x | t
0
i). (7)
The (interim) indiﬀerence curve of agent i of type ti through ¯ x (over
constant SCFs) is described by a hyperplane, H,i nRK−1
+ :







i (ti) − UK
i (ti)), for k =1 ,...K− 1. Consider the indiﬀer-













Given NTI, we must have p(ti) 6= 0 and p(t0
i) 6= 0. Moreover, p(ti) 6= cp(t0
i)
for a positive number c, as that would mean that Ui(ti)=cUi(t0
i)+γ, violating
condition TD. Thus, either p(ti)=cp(t0
i) where c<0 or there does not exist
c 6= 0 such that p(ti)=cp(t0
i). In the former case, it is easy to see (using
NTI) that any point which lies above H must be below H0 and by choosing
two points (one above H and one below it) close to ¯ x one ﬁnds constant
SCFs which satisfy (7). In the latter case, it is clear that we can choose two
constant SCFs x and x0 close to ¯ x satisfying (7).
Given (7) we can complete the proof by the same argument as in the
Lemma in Abreu and Matsushima (1992a) or Lemma 1 in Abreu and Mat-
sushima (1992b).
It is now easy to show that every SCF satisﬁes virtual monotonicity.
16Lemma 2 Suppose an environment E satisﬁes TD and NTI. Then every
SCF satisﬁes virtual monotonicity.
Proof: Suppose the environment satisﬁes NTI and TD. For any deception
α, there exists i ∈ N and ti ∈ Ti such that αi(ti) 6= ti. Given the SCFs,
(li(ti)) described in Lemma 1, deﬁne a pair of SCFs, y and x, where
y(t
0)=li(ti) for all t0 ∈ T and x(t0)=li(t0
i) for all t0 ∈ T.
By construction, x is incentive compatible. Note also that y is a constant
SCF. Since, αi(ti) 6= ti,












i) for all t0
i ∈ Ti.
Thus, for any deception α, and any SCF, condition (*) is satisﬁed with i ∈ N,
ti ∈ Ti, and SCFs y and x chosen as above.
Applying Theorem 1, we have the following Corollary.
Corollary 1 In an environment satisfying NTI and TD, every incentive
compatible SCF is virtually Bayesian implementable.
This result can also be proved directly by constructing a mechanism based
on the constant SCFs, (li(ti)). We have constructed such a mechanism with-



























































































Figure 1: Type Diversity
To illustrate TD, or its implications drawn out in Lemma 1, see Figure
1, drawn for the case of three pure alternatives, with alternative a2 ranked
above a1, which in turn is ranked above a3 (for all three types). This ﬁgure
is very similar to one that could be drawn to illustrate the power of virtual
Nash implementation in the complete information case. We can illustrate TD
in this ﬁgure only because condition TD concerns preferences over constant
SCFs. If an SCF is not constant, in principle the ﬁnal outcome it prescribes is
subject to deceptions, and an agent will ﬁnd diﬃculties evaluating such SCFs
because his Bernoulli utility or the ﬁnal lottery prescribed change from state
to state. Preferences over constant SCFs do not encounter this diﬃculty, and
the surprising fact is that imposing a condition on preferences over constant
SCFs alone turns out to be so powerful, as shown in Corollary 1.
18Conditions TD and NTI imply that every SCF is A-M measurable; see
Abreu and Matsushima (1992b, Section 4.2), and also the related condition of
interim value distinguished types in Palfrey and Srivastava (1993, deﬁnition
6.3). It is also easy to see that if TD and NTI are satisﬁed, the SCF f∗ = P
i∈N li(ti)
n , where li(ti) satisfy the inequalities in the statement of Lemma 1,
has the property that truth-telling is the only Bayesian equilibrium of the
direct mechanism for f∗. This implies that, under TD and NTI, every SCF
is incentive consistent, a condition which plays a crucial role in Duggan’s
(1997) suﬃciency result.
5 An Example
We now consider an important example (Example 3 in Palfrey and Srivastava
(1989b)) to show the permissiveness of our conditions and to clarify the
comparison between our results and related results in the literature. Palfrey
and Srivastava use this example to show the diﬃculties that may arise in an
environment with common values. There are two alternatives, A = {a,b}
and three agents. Each agent has two possible types, Ti = {ta,t b} and each
type is drawn independently with qi(tb)=q for all i and q2 > 0.5. Agents
have identical preferences, given by
ui(a,t)=
(




1 if at least two agents are of type tb
0 otherwise
For each agent, the corresponding interim utilities for the constant SCFs
assigning alternatives a and b are:
Ua
i (ta)=1 − q2,U b
i (ta)=q2,
Ua
i (tb)=( 1 − q)2,U b
i (tb)=1 − (1 − q)2.
Since q2 > 0.5, this implies that Ub
i (ti) >U a
i (ti) for all i and ti ∈ Ti; ordinal
preferences do not vary across types.
Consider the “majoritarian” SCF, x∗, which chooses a when at least two
agents are of type ta and b when at least two agents are of type tb. This SCF
does not satisfy Bayesian monotonicity. To see this consider the deception,
19αi(ti)=tb for all i and ti. Of course, x∗ ◦ α 6≈ x∗. Since x∗ ◦ α(t)=b for all
t and Ub
i (ti) >U a
i (ti) for all i and ti ∈ Ti, there does not exist y such that
Ui(y ◦ α | ti) >U i(x∗ ◦ α | ti) for any i and ti. As Palfrey and Srivastava
(1989b) show, this SCF is not implementable in undominated Bayesian Nash
equilibrium either. It can also be checked that in this environment, only
constant SCFs satisfy A-M measurability or incentive consistency.
We show now that every SCF satisﬁes virtual monotonicity in this exam-
ple. To begin with, consider the majoritarian SCF x∗. Let
λ =( 1− q)
2 < 1/2
and deﬁne x as follows:
x(t)=( 1− λ)x
∗ + λz(t)
where z makes the choice least preferred by the majority, i.e., z(t)=a if
x∗(t)=b and z(t)=b if x∗(t)=a.
The SCF x∗, choosing always the best alternative, yields a utility of 1
in each state, while z, choosing the worst alternative, yields 0 in each state.
Thus, x yields a utility of (1 − λ) in each state, and the interim utility of
each agent of each type is therefore (1 − λ), i.e.,
Ui(x|ta)=Ui(x|tb)=( 1− λ) for all i.
Notice that x chooses the best alternative with probability 1−λ and the
worst one with probability λ. Consider a unilateral deception from truth-
telling by agent i. This does not change the outcome if i is not pivotal. But in
each state where i is pivotal, this causes the outcome to be the best one with
probability λ and the worst one with probability (1−λ). Since λ<1/2, this
results in an interim utility less than (1−λ). Thus, x is incentive compatible.
In fact, the argument of the previous paragraph can be extended to show
that any deception α applied to x results in some agent receiving an interim
utility strictly less than (1 − λ).
If α(t) 6= t for some t, then there exists i such that
Ui(x ◦ α|tb) < (1 − λ). (8)
Of course, in each state t, ui(x ◦ α,t) ≤ 1 − λ. To prove (8), it suﬃces to
show that there exists i and t, with ti = tb such that x ◦ α(t) 6= x(t). There
are two cases to consider.
20case 1. Suppose there exists i such that αi(tb)=ta. If for some j 6= i,
αj(ta)=ta, this implies that for t such that ti = tb and tj = ta, tk = tb,
x ◦ α(t)=( 1− λ)a + λb while x(t)=( 1− λ)b + λa.
If αj(ta)=tb for both j 6= i, then for t such that ti = tb and tj = ta for j 6= i,
we have
x ◦ α(t)=( 1− λ)b + λa while x(t)=( 1− λ)a + λb.
Thus, in either case, Ui(x ◦ α|tb) < 1 − λ.
Case 2. Suppose α is such that all agents report truthfully when they
are of type tb. Then, there exists j such that αj(ta)=tb. Consider i 6= j and
the state t where ti = tb, tj = ta, tk = ta. Since αi(tb)=tb,
x ◦ α(t)=( 1− λ)b + λa while x(t)=( 1− λ)a + λb,
and Ui(x ◦ α|tb) < 1 − λ.
Deﬁne y to be the constant SCF which prescribes b in each state. Clearly,
for each i,
Ui(y|ta)=q
2,U i(y|tb)=1− (1 − q)
2.
Since y is constant, this means that for any deception α and any type ti,
yαi(ti)(t)=y(t) for all t. In particular,
Ui(y ◦ α|tb)=1− (1 − q)
2 =( 1− λ).
This, along with (8) implies that there exists i such that:
Ui(y ◦ α|tb) >U i(x ◦ α|tb). (9)
Recall that Ui(x|ta)=Ui(x|tb)=( 1− λ)=( 1− (1 − q)2 >q 2. Thus,
Ui(x|ta) ≥ Ui(yαi(ti)|ta) and Ui(x|tb) ≥ Ui(yαi(ti)|tb).
Given (9), this implies that x and y satisfy our condition, for any deception
α.
In fact, a slight modiﬁcation of the arguments above shows that for any
deception α, one can choose x to be x =( 1−β)x∗ +βz for β>0 arbitrarily
small (together with the same y, where the test-agent is always a type tb,
chosen as above).
21Since for every deception α, x∗ 6≈ x∗◦α, the desired preference reversal has
been found and x∗ satisﬁes virtual monotonicity. Moreover, since we have
found a preference reversal for every deception, it follows that every SCF
in this example satisﬁes virtual monotonicity. Since the environment clearly
satisﬁes NTI, it follows from Theorem 1 that every incentive compatible SCF
is virtually Bayesian implementable.
Checking for virtual monotonicity may sometimes be cumbersome. It
may then be easier to check that the environment satisﬁes TD. Actually,
this environment does not. However, TD is easily satisﬁed if we modify this
example to have a third alternative c. For instance, suppose ui(c,t) = 0 for
all i and all t ∈ T and the preferences over a and b are the same as before.
Note that
Ua




i (tb)=( 1 − q)2,U b
i (tb)=1 − (1 − q)2,U c
i (tb)=0 .
Clearly, TD is now satisﬁed. Thus, Corollary 1 applies to this modiﬁed
example; any incentive compatible SCF is virtually implementable. Since
TD holds, every SCF satisﬁes A-M measurability and incentive consistency
in this environment with three alternatives. However, the results of Abreu
and Matsushima (1992b) and Duggan (1997) cannot be applied to any non-
constant SCF even then. Abreu and Matsushima (1992b) use an assumption
(their assumption 2) which requires that in each state the ex-post preferences
(over lotteries) of the agents are diﬀerent, which is clearly not the case in the
present example. Duggan’s (1997) suﬃciency theorem uses a weaker version
of best element private values. This too fails in the present example.
It is of interest to note that even in this modiﬁed example, the majoritar-
ian SCF cannot be implemented in undominated Nash equilibrium; it can be
checked that it does not satisfy the necessary condition identiﬁed by Palfrey
and Srivastava (1989b). Of course, exact Bayesian implementation of a non-
constant SCF remains impossible; ordinal preferences over the alternatives
remain identical for all types of all agents even after the new alternative is
added, and only constant SCFs satisfy Bayesian monotonicity.
6 Concluding Remarks
We conclude with a few remarks that apply to both Theorem 1 and Corollary
1.
22Remark 1. Theorem 1 and the discussion in section 5 show that virtual
implementation in Bayesian equilibrium is more permissive than virtual im-
plementation in iterative undominated strategies or exact implementation in
undominated Bayesian equilibrium.
Remark 2. In environments violating TD, virtual implementation may be
impossible, through a general violation of virtual monotonicity. For instance,
this is the case in Example 1 of Serrano and Vohra (2001), where only con-
stant SCFs are virtually implementable in Bayesian equilibrium, even though
the set of incentive compatible SCFs contains many non-constant ones. In
fact, in the environment described in that example, implementation is also
impossible in other solution concepts: only constant SCFs satisfy the neces-
sary condition for undominated Bayesian implementation identiﬁed by Pal-
frey and Srivastava (1989b), and the necessary condition for perfect Bayesian
implementation identiﬁed by Brusco (1995). Non-constant SCFs in that ex-
ample also escape the suﬃcient conditions for implementation in sequential
equilibrium used in Baliga (1999) and in Bergin and Sen (1998).
Remark 3. In this paper we have used the traditional notion of imple-
mentability which ignores mixed strategies and imposes no restrictions on
the nature of the mechanism. If one were allowed to use small transfers,
and one were to insist on ‘regular mechanisms’ and virtual Bayesian imple-
mentation using mixed strategies, virtual monotonicity is not suﬃcient; A-M
measurability then becomes necessary, as shown by Abreu and Matsushima
(1992b).
Remark 4. Note that the integer game used in our mechanism can be re-
placed by a modulo game. Thus, virtual implementation does not require the
use of inﬁnite mechanisms for ﬁnite environments. This is to be contrasted
with the result of Dutta and Sen (1994) showing that inﬁnite mechanisms
may be unavoidable for exact Bayesian implementation. While the example
used by Dutta and Sen (1994) does not satisfy TD, it can be modiﬁed by
adding a third alternative which yields 0 utility to each agent in each state
to satisfy TD. It is easy to check that their result continues to apply to this
modiﬁed example but the mechanism constructed above, with a modulo game
instead of an integer game, is a ﬁnite mechanism that yields virtual Bayesian
implementation. Indeed, according to the Abreu-Matsushima (1992b) result,
under their conditions, virtual implementation can be accomplished through
a regular mechanism.
23Remark 5. Given the very positive results reported in this paper, one
may wonder how much they depend on the expected utility assumption. To
the extent that this is just an approximation of more realistic preferences, it
would be desirable that the assumption of expected utility be not a crucial one
for the theory. Indeed, it is not. One can easily see that all our conclusions
extend to preferences over lotteries that have lower contour sets that are
not nested in two diﬀerent environments (many monotonic preferences in
the sense of ﬁrst-order stochastic dominance will satisfy this). Reﬂection on
Figure 1 should suﬃce to convince the reader of this assertion: the relevant
indiﬀerence surfaces yielding non-nested lower contour sets in the interior
of the probability simplex is completely independent from having a map of
parallel straight lines (see Abreu and Sen (1991) for a similar observation in
the context of virtual Nash implementation).
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